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RAINBOW TROUT, INC., dba
POP JENKS,
Case No. 940218-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, and DEPARTMENT
OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,

Priority No. 14

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JTJRXSPICTIONAL STATEMENT ANP NATVRE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal arises from the district court's trial de novo
review of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission's informal
adjudicative proceeding.

The commission suspended Rainbow

Trout's liquor license for five days and assessed $535 in
administrative costs-

On review, Third District Court Judge

David S. Young overturned the commission's order and dismissed
the administrative complaint.

This Court has jurisdiction over

this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(b)(i) (Supp.
1993) .

1

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

When an administrative agency imposes disciplinary action
against a licensee for conduct that violates the conditions of
the license and the criminal law, is the agency's standard of
proof a "preponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable
doubt?"
This issue was not preserved in the trial court because it
did not arise until the court issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
STANDARD OF APPELATE REVIEW
The appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of
law for correctness of error.ffeiderhfryigeyBvilcterg Sfflfl
Development Corp. v. Campbell. 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App.
1992) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Other than the cases discussed in the brief, there are not
determinative authorities pertinent to this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 24, 1992, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control ("ABC") issued a Notice of Agency Action and
Administrative Complaint against Rainbow Trout Inc.# dba Pop
2

Jenks ("Pop Jenks").

(R. at 1-21).

The administrative complaint

alleged that Pop Jenks, a private club, had served alcohol to two
individuals who were neither members nor properly sponsored
guests. (lii.) At an informal adjudicative hearing on March 26,
1992, the Hearing Examiner found Pop Jenks guilty of the
allegation and recommended a five-day suspension and payment of
administrative costs of $535.

(R. at 16-18). On April 24, 1992,

the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's recommendation and
the imposed the recommended penalty.

(R. at 20-21).

On May 14, 1992, Pop Jenks filed a petition for review and
trial de novo in Third District Court. (R. at 1-21).

Judge David

Young held an evidentiary hearing on February 14, 1994 and issued
his memorandum decision on February 15, 1994. (R. at 143-47), The
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Judgment on March 15, 1994. (R. at 163).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts is taken from the trial
court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
When the commission entered its order, Pop Jenks was a
business establishment located in Park City, Utah.
a private club liquor license.

Pop Jenks had

(R. at 2). On December 18, 1991,
3

two undercover agents entered Pop Jenks and requested service
from a bartender.

(Id.)

The bartender asked the agents if they

were members of the club and the agents replied that they were
not.

(Id.)

The agents testified that the bartender told them

"Steve is in the back room; he will sponsor you."

(R. at 158).

The agents never saw "Steve." (Id.)
Steve Bennett, co-owner of the club, gave the bartender an
"OK" sign with his hand as a sign of being willing to sponsor the
individuals.

The bartender then served them alcohol.

Neither Bennett nor the agents made any effort to meet.

IJd.)
Based

upon that conduct, the agents notified the ABC of the alleged
violations and that agency subsequently issued an administrative
complaint.

In its memorandum decision the day after the

evidentiary hearing, the lower court ruled that the ABC had
failed to prove its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. at
145; Attached as Addendum A). According to the court, it assumed
that the burden of proof was "beyond a reasonable doubt" because
all violations of the liquor laws constituted at least class B
misdemeanors.

(R. at 145; Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-104 (Supp.

1993; Addendum A).

The trial court concluded that the agency

failed "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the agents were
not sponsored guests under the provision of 32A-5-107";
4

therefore, the trial court dismissed the administrative complaint
and ordered the ABC to expunge from its records all references to
the allegations. (R. at 159; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment, Attached as Addendum B)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court applied the wrong standard of proof in
its review of ABCfs administrative action.

Although the "beyond

a reasonable doubt" standard would apply to any criminal
prosecutions brought as a result of Pop Jenk!s conduct, that
standard does not apply to action taken solely against the
private club license.
Fundamental respect for the liberty of individuals requires
a stringent burden of proof in any case in which a person faces
criminal punishment.

The imposition of this burden upon the

prosecution reflects the dire nature of the penalties that can
occur if guilt is established.

However important a private club

license may be to running a profitable business though, the
state's burden to support disciplinary action against that
license is not similarly heavy.

At most, the state is obligated

to prove the allegations by a preponderance of evidence.
The district court's action is manifestly erroneous.

In

analogous cases, the Utah Supreme Court has held that even though
5

the conduct forming the basis of a civil or administrative charge
is criminal, the burden of proof before a civil or administrative
tribunal is a "preponderance of the evidence".

The record does

not indicate whether the district court's decision would have
been different had it viewed the evidence through the proper
lens.

However, due to the use of the incorrect evidentiary

standard, this Court should remand this case to the Third
District Court for either a new trial or for review by the court
of the record, including the transcript, with the proper
evidentiary standard in mind.

THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVE CRIMINAL CONDUCT BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT DOES NOT APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF LICENSING
RULES OR CRIMINAL CONDUCT•

in walker vf Bp^yd of Pardons, 803 p.2d 1241 (Utah 1990),
the Utah Supreme Court held that the burden of proof in
administrative proceedings was "a preponderance of the evidence."
Walker made a claim similar to that agreed to here by the
district court:

because his parole revocation was based on

criminal conduct, either a criminal conviction or a standard of
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" was necessary to support
revocation.

With no discussion except a brief reference to a

6

prior case, Jones v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986),
the Walker court concluded that the criminal burden of proof was
not applicable to administrative proceedings even if criminal
conduct was the basis of the charge.
The United States Supreme Court also has ruled that civil
cases do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt even when
criminal conduct is involved.

In One Lot Emerald Cvt Stones vf

United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1971), the Court distinguished
between a criminal forfeiture, in which a forfeiture occurs as
part of a criminal adjudication, and a civil forfeiture
proceeding, in which property is forfeited in a hearing separate
from the criminal action.

When forfeiture occurs as a result of

a criminal trial, essentially counting as part of the punishment,
the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
However, in Emerald Stones, the proceeding at issue was a
separate adjudication brought under the civil provisions of the
forfeiture laws.

id.

Thus, the defendant's acquittal in the

criminal case did not preclude civil forfeiture because of the
difference in the standard of proof:

"beyond a reasonable doubt"

in the criminal action versus "preponderance of the evidence" in
the civil.

7

Had Pop Jenks1 license-holder been subject to criminal
prosecution and found guilty of a class B misdemeanor for
violating the liquor laws, he or she could have faced six months
imprisonment and a substantial fine.

This substantial

deprivation of liberty requires the heaviest burden of proof
possible.

However, in the actual administrative proceeding at

issue here, Pop Jenks received a suspension of its ability to
serve alcohol for five days.

Though Pop Jenk's

license is a property interest, applying a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard is out of proportion to the potential sanction.

CQNCLVSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request
that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and remand
the case to the Third District Court for further consideration
under the appropriate standard of proof.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 0{ J

day of July 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

JAMA 4 hx*$\
James H. Beadl<
James
Beadles
Assistant Attorney General

8

CERTIFICATE QF MfrlfrINg
I certify that on the 3^«/ day of July 1994, I caused to be
mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to:
Allan M. Metos
Brickyard Towers -- Suite 250
1245 East Brickyard Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

9

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

*

No

f

EB 15 m4

^

C-'t of Summit C o o ^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI&
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM
DECISION

RAINBOW TROUT, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba, POP JENKS, *
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, and DEPARTMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,
Defendant.

CASE #920311471

This case comes before the court on a PETITION FOR REVIEW AND TRIAL DE
NOVO requested by the plaintiff. The matter follows an informal hearing of March 26,
1992 wherein Administrative Law Judge Richard R. Golden prepared FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS as to the plaintiffs alleged
violations of it's private club liquor license requirements.
The facts are that on the 18th of December 1991, agents Jody Dahl and Brad Blair
entered Plaintiffs business and requested service. The bartender asked if they were
members to which they said they were not. The bartender then sought sponsorship from an
unidentified person in the club. That person responded that he could not since he was on
duty at the time. The bartender then said "Steve/ who was in the back room, would
sponsor them. The agents never saw "Steve."
Steven Bennett testified that he was a co-owner of the business, that he was present
on the occasion, and that he gave the bartender the "A-Okay" sign as being willing to
sponsor the agents. Unfortunately, Mr. Bennett was not observed by the agents nor did the

bartender make any effort to see that they knew who was sponsoring them. Mr. Bennett
testified that from the office he was visible to the bartender but not to the patrons. The
agents were thereafter served the drinks they ordered.
Mr. Bennett testified that he maintained a record (Exhibit 5) of the sponsorships
during the month of December in 1991 and even though the date column states the month as
"2" or February, that in fact the document was prepared during December and should have
read "12." Corresponding with the 18th of December (the date of the alleged offense) there
is an entry that "Steve" sponsored "2" guests at "7:30" P.M., the time of the complained
offense.
Under 32A-5-107 UCA, as amended, we read in (7) "A private club may not sell
alcoholic beverages to any person other than a member, guest, or visitor who holds a valid
visitor card issued under Section (6)." No "visitor" card was purchased nor requested.
Under (5) of the same section we read, "Each private club may allow guests or
visitors to use the premises only when previously authorized by a member..."
Plaintiff argues that the agents were "guests" authorized by Mr. Bennett. The term
"guest" is defined in 32A-1-104 (18) UCA, as amended, to be "...a person accompanied by
an active member or visitor of a club who enjoys only those privileges derived from the host
for the duration of the visit to the club."
The Plaintiff argues that the agents were sponsored guests. The agents argue that the
"sponsorship" was a ruse or was non-existent.

[2]

Witness Mark Whittaker testified that he as worked in enforcement and investigations
for some thirteen (13) years and has been the Officer in charge for two (2) years. He
testified that the law is variously applied throughout the state and that in Park City, with a
tourist trade, the clubs "sponsor" lots of "guests" for whom there is no prior acquaintance.
In fact, some clubs keep a member present to "sponsor" "guests" so that they don't have to
become "visitors" which requires purchase of a temporary membership.
The statute says nothing about the relationship, if any, that must exist between a
"sponsor" and a "guest."
Since section 32A-12-104 UCA, as amended, makes violation of the liquor laws a
Class B Misdemeanor and since the sections incorporate Title 76 involving the Utah Criminal
Code provisions into the liquor enforcement provisions, the court assumes that the standard
of proof in this case is "beyond a reasonable doubt." That being so, the court concludes that
there remains a reasonable doubt as to whether the agents were in fact "sponsored." There
can be no doubt that the matter was discussed and the bartender indicated that the agents
were being "sponsored" by "Steve." Steve testified that he did so and while the evidence is
unfortunately vague if not inaccurate, the court finds that there remains sufficient question as
to compliance that the court must find for the plaintiff and against the defendant. The Court
finds that the complaint filed against the Plaintiff should be and is hereby dismissed.
Mr. Metos is requested to prepare FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, and an ORDER OF DISMISSAL consistent herewith and with the pleadings and

[3]

evidence introduced.
Dated, February 15, 1994

^COUNTY Mf

ex. to Counsel

'''MllHM****

[4]

Case No: 920311471 AA
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the /5"U day of <&&

19W

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
RAINBOW TROUT INC
Plaintiff

UT ST DEPT ALCOHOLIC BEV CONTR
Defendant

PBP JENKS
Doing Business As

ALLAN M METOS
Atty for Plaintiff
1245 EAST BRICKYARD ROAD
SLC UT 84106

BETSY L ROSS
Atty for Defendant
4120 STATE OFFICE BLDG
SALT LAKE CITY,
UT 84114
District Court Clerk

By: C W /). /PlAZtf
U U Deputy Clerk
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ADDENDUM B

NO.

ALLAN M. METOS - 2249
Attorney for Plaintiff
Brickyard Tower Suite 250
1245 East Brickyard Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 467-1555

FILED
N&R !§'£••*

#1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo
RAINBOW TROUT, INC.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintifff
v.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,

Case No. 920311471 AA
Honorable David S. Young

Defendant.
—oooOooo—••
THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial this 15th day of
February, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, one of the
judges of the above entitled court.
The Plaintiff was represented by Counsel Allan M. Metos
and Defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General, Betsy
L. Ross.
The

Plaintiff

introduced

its

evidence

and

rested,

Defendant introduced its evidence and rested, the evidence closed,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises made the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On the 18th day of December, 1991, two undercover

agents entered Plaintiff's private club, known as Pop Jenks,
located in Pack City, Utah.
2.

The liguor control agents requested service from a

bartender who wore a beverage control badge with the name of
"Aldis."
3.

Aldis asked the agents if they were members of the

club, to which they replied they were not.
4.

Under Utah Code Ann. S 32A-5-107, a private club may

not sell alcoholic beverages to any person other than a member,
guest or a visitor with a valid visitor card.

Violation of said

statute is a Class B misdemeanor under Utah law.

The State is

required to prove guilt in a Class B misdemeanor

"beyond a

reasonable doubt.H
5.

Said agents were not members of the club and a valid

visitor's card was not issued nor was one requested by the agents.
6.

The only other provision for entrance and use of a

private club under Utah law is the sponsored guest provision of the
statute.

The agents' own report states that the bartender sought

sponsorship for the two agents from an undisclosed person in the
club.

That person responded that he could not sponsor the agents

since he was on duty.

The agent's report states the undisclosed
2

a\rain-ut*h.fin

person said "Steve is in the back room; he will sponsor you.M

The

agents who were seated at the bar with their backs to the office
back room stated they never saw "Steve."
7•

Steve Bennett, co-owner of the club was not on duty

that day, but was in the club's office using the phone to book a
fishing trip to New Zealand.

Steve gave the bartender, Aldis, an

"OK" sign with his hand as a sign as being to willing to sponsor
the agents.
8.

The agents were then served a drink.
Neither Mr. Bennett nor the agents made any effort

to meet each other or determine sponsorship.
9.

The two agents were visible to Mr. Bennett, but Mr.

Bennett was not visible to the two agents who were at the bar with
their back to Mr. Bennett and his office.
10.

The statute requiring sponsorship does not define or

make any reference to the relationship, if any, that must exist
between a "sponsor and a guest."

The customary private club

practice in the Park City area entails the sponsorship of a great
number of guests by club members who have no prior acquaintance
with said guest, according to the Defendant's witnesses, Blair and
Whitaker.
11 • The statutes involved do not require a written
record be kept by the club showing sponsorship, nor that any prior
relationship be in existence to sponsor membership.
3
a\rain-ut*h.fin

From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court made the
following conclusions of law.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Utah State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control has
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that said agents were not
sponsored guests under the provision of 32A-5-107, and for that
reason the complaint of the Utah State Department of Alcoholic
Beverage

Control

against

Plaintiff

should be

dismissed

with

prejudicef no cause of action. Each party to bear their own costs.

DATED this

VSA COUNTY jto/
**

a\rtln-utah.fin
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No,

ALLAN M. METOS - 2249

F I L E D

Attorney for Plaintiff
Brickyard Tower Suite 250
1245 East Brickyard Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 467-1555

"^
MAR 15 1994
<**ofSummhcWy

*

^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—-oooOooo--RAINBOW TROUT, INC.
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,

Case No. 920311471 AA
Honorable David S. Young

Defendant.
—— oooOooo
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on the
15th day of February, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young,
one of the judges of the above entitled court, on the motion of
Defendant Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint on the ground said complaint was moot under
Utah law. The Plaintiff was represented by Counsel Allan M. Metos
and Defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General Betsy
L. Ross, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, having
read Defendant's memorandum of law and supplemental memorandum of
law and Plaintiff's response to the same, made the following
findings of fact:

1.

All dispositive motions under the provisions of Utah

Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(g) must be heard at

J

vGt^

least thirty (30) days before the trial date.
to dismiss was filed less than thirteen

Defendant's motion

(13) days before the

scheduled trial date, and is deemed untimely.
2.

The Plaintiff in this matter has requested the

removal of Plaintiff's conviction by the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, which is made part of the findings of fact in all
proceedings before the Commission. The removal of such a violation
from the record does offer the Court, if it chooses, the ability to
offer effectual relief to the aggrieved party.
3.

The right of judicial review should not be defeated

by short-term orders rescinding operation of Plaintiff's license,
capable of repetition by Defendant, yet evading review.

A series

of suspension orders of less than twenty (20) days, as reflected in
the presiding hearing officer's recommendation in this matter to
the Liquor Commission, is too short to make effectual judicial
review possible during the life of the suspension order.
4.

The Court is familiar with the provision Utah Code

Ann. S 63-46b-15(l)(a), and the recent Utah Court of Appeals
decision, Cordova v. Blackstock, 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Nov 2,
1944), both of which require the Court not only to review the
informal administrative proceeding but to also hold a new trial.
Based on the above findings of fact, the Court made the
following order.
2
aNxmin-ut&h.ord

BOOKQQPAGE 6 4 5

IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds
said complaint was moot; be and the same is hereby denied.

DATED t h i s

*£•£,
*^~
day o f -j£*}MNMMry,

1994

/v?

•\*ain-utah.ord
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ALLAN M. METOS - 2249

F 1L t U

Attorney for Plaintiff
Brickyard Tower Suite 250
1245 East Brickyard Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 467-1555
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAINBOW TROUT, INC,

-—oooOooo—

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

v.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,

Case No. 920311471 AA
Honorable David S. Young

Defendant•
-—oooOooo—
THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial this 15th day of
February, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, one of the
judges of the above entitled court.
The Plaintiff was represented by Counsel Allan M. Metos
and Defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General, Betsy
L. Ross.
The

Plaintiff

introduced

its evidence

and

rested,

Defendant introduced its evidence and rested, the evidence closed,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises having heretofore
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and good cause
appearing therefore made the following decree:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Utah
State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control's complaint filed
against the Plaintiff, Rainbow Trout, Inc., (Pop Jenks), in Case

BnwnnPAftP kk?

No. 92-030L be and the same is dismissed with prejudice, no cause
of action.

Each party to bear their own costs and attorney fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that all reference to above
hearing and conviction before said DABC Administrative Hearing
Board be expunged from the records of the Plaintiff, Rainbow Trout
dba Pop Jenks within ten (10) days of the date of this order.

DATED this

l*> day of March, 1994.

£\ COUNTY /?/
'"'/ft'MHIMtV

•\rtia-utah.jud

Bomcn r\ our*

l

i r\

